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Reinach was one of the most eminent representatives of the so-called “realist 
phenomenology” — a term which usually encompasses Husserl’s first pupils in Göttingen. In 
spite of his untimely death in 1917 at the age of 33, Reinach left a profound and powerful 
work, the significance of which went unrecognized until rediscovered by Barry Smith, Kevin 
Mulligan, James DuBois, and Karl Schuhmann about twenty years ago.1 His numerous 
writings are devoted to a wide range of philosophical topics, especially language, right, 
action, and realist ontology. 
The present study is about one of the most innovative aspects of Reinach’s philosophy, 
namely his theory of states of affairs. Its purpose is to show that this theory — like, to a lesser 
extent, Meinong’s theory of object, with which it has striking similarities — may be regarded 
as an insightful alternative to Bolzanian semantic objectivism, including its phenomenological 
variant in Husserl’s Logical Investigations (B. Smith, 1987b, p. 192; B. Smith, 1989a, p. 52). 
For one of Reinach’s most original views on logic is that it should, at least to some extent, be 
redefined as a theory of states of affairs. This view of logic was very different from Husserl’s, 
and explicitly rejected by other realist phenomenologists, such as Alexander Pfänder.2 
Reinach’s theory of states of affairs provides at least a healthy questioning of the Fregean 
view, at best a fruitful alternative to the “Myth of Meaning.” In any case, it raises some 
                                                 
1 For a bio-bibliographical survey see K. Schuhmann & B. Smith (1987), B. Smith (1987a), K. Schuhmann 
(1984). 
2 See Pfänder (1921), p. 165, who transfers states of affairs to the theory of knowledge and limits logic to 
“judgments considered purely as such.” 
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fundamental questions which are too often neglected, especially the question of what logic is 
about (cf. DuBois, 1995, p. 123). My aim is to sketch the contours of Reinach’s philosophy of 
logic, and to discuss its most important philosophical implications and difficulties. I shall first 
briefly recall what a state of affairs is in Reinach’s view, and outline his attempt to reduce 
logic to a theory of states affairs. Next, I shall try to show that Reinach’s phenomenological 
realism is a direct consequence of his bias in favor of states affairs against propositions. I shall 
conclude by pointing out some difficulties of Reinach’s approach, which are due less to its 
realist than to its Meinongian background. 
 
 
1. States of affairs 
 
The notion of state of affairs (Sachverhalt) plays in Reinach’s philosophy a central role which 
has no equivalent, except perhaps in Wittgenstein’s Tractatus (B. Smith, 1982, p. 293; B. 
Smith, 1987b, p. 223).3 On this subject Reinach mainly refers to Husserl and Meinong. 
However, his states of affairs are, in key respects, more akin to Meinong’s “objectives” than 
to Husserl’s states of affairs. There are at least three important differences between his and 
Husserl’s states of affairs. 
First, in a way that recalls the Tractatus, Reinach draws a sharp distinction between states of 
affairs and objects (Gegenstände). States of affairs certainly are “objectual correlates” of 
judgments, but they are not “objects in the strict sense” (TnU, p. 111/334, p. 114/338). The 
red flower I see is an object; the fact that the flower is red, “its being-red,” is a state of affairs. 
                                                 
3 As Barry Smith (1989a) has pointed out, the philosophical notion of state of affairs can be traced back to Julius 
Bergmann (1879), p. 2 ff., p. 252 ff., who defines the correctness of judgment as an “adequation with the state of 
affairs” (Übereinstimmung mit dem Sachverhalt). Another, better-known source is the 1888 lecture by Carl 
Stumpf to which Reinach refers in his essay on negative judgment. See TnU, p. 114/373. The following 
abbreviations will be used throughout this paper: TnU for Reinach, “Zur Theorie des negativen Urteils” (page 
references are to the Schuhmann-Smith edition, followed by pagination of English translation); EiP for Reinach, 
“Einleitung in die Philosophie”; NAS for Reinach, “Notwendigkeit und Allgemeinheit im Sachverhalt”; ÜPh for 
Reinach, “Über Phänomenologie”; WSU for Reinach, “Wesen und Systematik des Urteils”; WJ for Reinach, 
“William James und der Pragmatismus”; LU for Husserl, Logische Untersuchungen (with German pagination of 
original, followed by English pagination). See Bibliography for complete references. 
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On the other hand, object and state of affairs, the flower and its being-red, are both 
“objectities” (Gegenständlichkeiten) or “objective formations” (gegenständliche Gebilde), 
these terms being generic titles for any entity of any kind. 
Secondly, Reinach opposes the existence (Existenz) of objects to the “occurrence” or 
“obtaining” (Bestand) of states of affairs. This distinction is more than merely of a 
terminological kind. A noteworthy difference is that, given a state of affairs /S is P/, this state 
of affairs’s non-obtaining involves there being an obtaining negative state of affairs /S is not 
P/, while the inexistence of an object A does not imply the existence of a negative object non-
A. For example, the fact that the flower’s being red does not obtain implies that the flower’s 
not being red obtains, but the inexistence of Santa Claus does not imply the existence of a 
non-Santa Claus (TnU, p. 117/341). 
Husserl, too, used the verb bestehen to qualify states of affairs, but it does not seem that he 
ever treated occurrence and existence as mutually exclusive. Reinach’s view seems much 
closer, in this respect, to Meinong’s theory of “objectives,” with this difference, however, that 
for Meinong not only states of affairs “obtain,” but also ideal objects such as numbers and 
geometrical figures (TnU, p. 116/374). 
Thirdly, Reinach and Husserl also disagree on non-obtaining states of affairs. The former 
clearly affirms, in his essay on negative judgment, that “occurrence is by no means included 
as an essential moment within the concept of a state of affairs” (TnU, p. 116/374). This means 
that a state of affairs does not need to obtain in order to be a state of affairs, or that states of 
affairs may obtain or not obtain. Hence we may suppose that a complete theory of states of 
affairs should deal with non-obtaining states of affairs such as the being-gold of a mountain, 
or even with necessarily non-obtaining states of affairs, like the being-round of a square. Here 
again, Meinong’s influence is obvious and explicit (TnU, pp. 116-117/340-341). From the 
point of view of Husserl’s Logical Investigations, by contrast, the being-gold of the mountain 
is not an object, nor, a fortiori, a state of affairs. It is nothing at all, even though “the 
mountain is golden” is an existing (false) proposition. 
In his essay on negative judgment, Reinach proposes five necessary and sufficient conditions 
for states of affairs (TnU, p. 114/338 ff.; cf. WSU, pp. 343-344; EiP, p. 427): 
 
(1) A state of affairs may be “believed or asserted” (geglaubt oder behauptet). 
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In other words, states of affairs, and only them, are subject to “assertions” (Behauptungen) 
and to beliefs or “convictions” (Überzeugungen). It is impossible to assert or believe an 
object. As only belief and assertion are usually called judgments (Urteile), states of affairs 
may be defined as objectual correlates of judgments. 
 
(2) States of affairs, and only them, may stand in relations of implication. 
 
If we are in presence of antecedent-consequent or “foundation” (Begründung) relations, then 
we can be sure that we are in presence of states of affairs.4 
 
(3) States of affairs, and only them, present modalities. 
 
There are states of affairs not only of the form /S is P/, but also of the form /S is presumably 
P/, /S is possibly P/, etc. This very strong thesis is in marked contrast to the views of Husserl 
and Pfänder, who both admit ontological as well as logical modalities (cf. DuBois, 1995, p. 
118 ff.). Likewise, Husserl does not seem to confine ontological modalities to propositional 
acts. 
 
(4) States of affairs, and only them, may be positive or negative. 
 
Thus, it is only in a “derivative” sense that propositions and judgments are said to be positive 
or negative. This condition corresponds to the view, usually associated with Aristotle and also 
defended by Brentano, that there can be no negative presentations. There are states of affairs 
of the negative form /S is not P/, but it makes no sense to talk of negative objects, for example 
of non-Socrates or a non-pen. 
                                                 
4 Cf. EiP, p. 460: relations of Grund and Folge are expressed by “hypothetical propositions.” 
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(5) States of affairs, and only them, may be known (erkannt). 
 
This condition should not be confused with condition (1). For knowledge, according to 
Reinach, is different from both belief and assertion. “Knowledge,” which Reinach also calls 
“evidence” (Evidenz), is the mode of givenness peculiar to states of affairs (TnU, p. 123/375). 
Objects, when perceived or imagined, are “seen” (gesehen), or geschaut; states of affairs are 
not seen, but “known,” or erschaut. Once again, Reinach’s analysis sharply contrasts with the 
Logical Investigations, in which states of affairs were held to be given in some special type of 
categorial intuition, in “acts of synthesis.” Reinach explicitly distinguishes his evidences from 
Husserl’s categorial intuitions, which he claims always give us objects, not states of affairs 
(LU6, §§ 48-49; cf. TnU, p. 119/343). 
According to Reinach, beliefs and assertions presuppose the knowledge of the state of affairs. 
Suppose, for instance, that you discuss with a colleague what color this or that object in the 
room is (cf. TnU, p. 97/317). You get closer and find that the object is red. This means that a 
state of affairs, the being-red of the object, is given to you, and it is only on the basis of this 
evidence that you can believe that the object is red. Next, you come back to your colleague 
and say: “This is red.” What is expressed by this statement, Reinach notes, is not merely a 
belief. There is also an act of asserting by which I “intend” or “mean” (meine) a state of 
affairs that is no longer given or “known.” So, belief and assertion are independent of the 
knowledge of the state of affairs, but at the same time they can possibly be based on such 
knowledge. 
Interestingly enough, these distinctions are supposed to apply to negative states of affairs as 
well. The idea is that the belief that the object is not yellow does not merely presuppose that 
the subject is given a positive state of affairs /the object is red/, but also that she “grasps” a 
necessary implication relation between this state of affairs and the negative state of affairs /the 
object is not yellow/. Now, in Reinach’s view, both constitute a genuine knowledge or 
positive evidence of the negative state of affairs /the object is not yellow/.5 
                                                 
5 TnU, p. 124/353: “... wird auch dieser negative Sachverhalt erkannt.” 
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The five conditions above are necessary and sufficient conditions. They can be fulfilled only 
by states of affairs: “These determinations are to this extent sufficient, that every entity to 
which they apply is of necessity a state of affairs.” (TnU, p. 117/341.) 
Note that Reinach’s lessons of 1913 published in the Sämtliche Werke as “Introduction to 
Philosophy” provide a slightly different list (EiP, p. 427). Reinach substitutes for condition 
(5) — the possibility of being “known” — the following criterion: unlike objets, which exist 
or do not exist, states of affairs and only them “obtain (bestehen) or do not obtain.” This 
criterion is closely connected to condition (4). The main difference, as we have seen, is that 
the non-obtaining of a state of affairs entails the obtaining of the contradictory state of affairs. 
For example: the fact that the flower’s being-red does not obtain entails that the flower’s not-
being-red obtains. Nothing similar is true of objects: the inexistence of Santa Claus does not 





In Husserl’s Logical Investigations, logic was defined as a theory of science or a theory of 
theories. Since a theory, in Husserl’s view, is a system of propositions, logic was equally 
defined to be a theory of propositions. According to Husserl, just as for Bolzano and Frege, 
logic is a theory whose objects are theories and parts of theories, that is, propositions as well 
as parts and systems of propositions, in short: meanings (Bedeutungen). Logic is thus distinct 
from formal ontology, which is the formal theory of objects, including states of affairs. 
Furthermore, logic in Husserl’s sense is also different from the psychology of judgment. 
According to the Investigations, the logician studies propositions in specie, “in themselves,” 
regardless of their instantiation in judgments, thoughts, questions, etc. This allows her to 
enunciate a priori or “ideal” laws, whereas descriptive psychology is confined to inductive or 
“real” laws. 
                                                 
6 The realist phenomenologist Jean Hering (1921), p. 497, made a similar remark about properties: while for any 
state of affairs /S is P/ there is a contradictorily opposed negative state of affairs /S is not P/, there is no negative 
property contradictorily opposed to the property P. 
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Reinach never defended such a Bolzanian-style view of logic, and this certainly makes his 
approach both unique and innovative when compared to Husserl’s Logical Investigations. For 
him, as we shall see, logic must be, first and foremost, a theory of states of affairs. Thus, the 
first question to be asked is what becomes of propositions in Reinach’s philosophy of logic. 
Reinach’s preserved work gives only few hints about this crucial question, which is left 
largely unexplored by commentators. 
A first point to be taken into account is that Reinach, far from rejecting the notion of 
proposition altogether, explicitly appropriates the distinction between proposition and state of 
affairs (TnU, p. 138/376; cf. Künne, 1987, p. 184). In a passage from the Nachlass quoted by 
Barry Smith, Reinach regrets that “all Austrians always confuse propositions and states of 
affairs.”7 Likewise, in two footnotes of his essay on negative judgment, he objects to 
Meinong that his notion of “objective” rests upon a confusion between proposition and state 
of affairs, which leads him to erroneously hold them as true or false (TnU, p. 114/373-374, p. 
116/374). In fact, he argues, “states of affairs obtain or do not obtain; propositions are true
false” (TnU, p. 116/374). Just as Husserl in the Logical Investigations, Reinach thus 
distinguishes between judgments which are correct or incorrect (richtig oder unrichtig), 
propositions which are true or false, and states of affairs which obtai
 or 
n or do not obtain. 
                                                
In a lecture dated December 1910, Reinach defines proposition as follows: 
 
A proposition (Satz) in our sense is not a grammatical proposition, but the meaning of a 
group of words, the thought that serves as its foundation. The proposition is independent of 
the judging experiences and factual cases. It is ideal and extra-temporal. (NAS, p. 351.) 
 
It is plausible to say that the term “thought” (Gedanke) is borrowed from Frege, whose works, 
as we know from the lecture On Phenomenology of 1914, were known to Reinach. However, 
Reinach uses the word in a broader sense, according to which not only propositional 
(Satzgedanken), but also nominal meanings are Gedanken (EiP, p. 419-420).8 In any case, this 
definition of proposition is hardly distinguishable from Husserl’s definition in the Logical 
 
7 B II 5, p. 375, quoted by B. Smith (1982), p. 310, footnote 16. 
8 The same use can be found in Pfänder (1921), p. 141 f., pp. 158-159. 
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Investigations: the proposition is some variety of meaning (Bedeutung), it is in some sense 
“objective,” its truth or falsity is independent of the mental act in which it is thought or 
asserted, etc. 
In fact, the disagreement between Reinach and Husserl is not about the distinction between 
judgment, proposition, and state of affairs. The substantive difference in their positions turns 
on how they conceive of the mutual relationships between those three terms. On a closer look, 
it seems as if there were no more room for propositions in Reinach’s philosophy. One might 
even be tempted to see Reinach’s concept of proposition as an unnecessary import from the 
Logical Investigations. The import seems unnecessary, mainly because Reinach, unlike 
Husserl, does not need to appeal to propositions to account for the fact that an incorrect 
judgment has sense. Again, this results from his broadly Meinongian starting point. While the 
possibility for a proposition to be false allows Husserl to reject non-obtaining states of affairs, 
the acceptance of non-obtaining states of affairs allows Reinach to do without propositions in 
themselves. The question, then, is which parsimony is to be preferred. 
Reinach’s depreciation of the propositional or semantic dimension creates a number of 
difficulties which are characteristic of his theory of states of affairs. On the one hand, the 
question arises whether it is possible in all cases to replace propositions with states of affairs. 
Thus, Reinach sometimes tends to ascribe to states of affairs certain functions which seem 
distinctive of propositions. Despite his — Husserlian — definition of proposition as the 
meaning of a statement, Reinach sometimes suggests that the meaning of the statement is 
provided by the corresponding state of affairs. Hence one can ask whether he did not make the 
same mistake he criticized in Meinong and “the Austrians,” namely the mistake of confusing 
propositions and states of affairs. For example, in the essay on negative judgment (TnU, p. 
112-113/336), Reinach raises the question of whether states of affairs are necessarily 
relational. Consider the rose’s being red, which can be expressed by a statement such as “the 
rose is red.” This state of affairs, he notes, can be equated with obviously relational states of 
affairs such as /the rose forms the substrate of the red/ or /the red inheres in the rose/. But 
does this entail that the state of affairs /the rose is red/ is relational? Surely not, Reinach 
suggests. Although equivalent, that is, built up upon one and the same thing “the red rose,” 
the three states of affairs are different. Now, they are different, Reinach tells us, in that the 
three statements are “different in sense” (bedeutungsverschieden) (EiP, p. 112, footnote). The 
statements “the rose is red,” “the rose forms the substrate of the red,” and “the red inheres in 
the rose” are not synonymous, and the difference in meaning indicates that they refer to 
different states of affairs. However, this approach presents difficulties in the case of incorrect 
affirmative judgments. In Reinach’s view, two incorrect affirmative judgments, if they are 
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different in sense, must refer to two different states of affairs. But if so, then both of these 
must be non-obtaining states of affairs. Why, then, talk about states of affairs rather than 
propositions? It is now the notion of state of affairs that seems unnecessary. More on this 
below. 
3. Logic as a theory of states of affairs 
What is “logic”? And what do we take “logical” to mean when we talk about “logical 
principles”? Husserl and Reinach sharply differ in how they answer this question, and it is in 
that respect that Reinach’s philosophy of logic seems the most novel and forceful if compared 
with the Logical Investigations.9 
The answer to this question is to be found in a footnote at the end of the essay on negative 
judgment, which I shall take as a starting point. The problem at stake is about the principle of 
non-contradiction, which Reinach construes in terms of states of affairs. Basically, he claims, 
the principle of non-contradiction means that two states of affairs /S is P/ and /S is not P/ 
cannot both obtain at the same time. The footnote generalizes this result to all logical laws, or 
at least to a large part of them: 
 
It will be seen that these principles relate to states and their obtaining (Bestand); the same 
holds for the other fundamental principles of traditional logic. These have normally been 
related to judgments, e.g.: two contradictory judgments cannot both be correct. This 
principle is certainly incontestable, but it is a derived and not a primitive principle. A 
judgment is correct if the state of affairs corresponding to it obtains; and two contradictory 
judgments cannot both be correct because two contradictory states of affairs cannot both 
obtain. The law pertaining to judgments thus obtains its foundation from the corresponding 
law which relates to states of affairs. Attempts have been made from other quarters to relate 
this law not to judgments but to propositions. Two contradictory propositions, it is now said, 
cannot both be true. We acknowledge freely the difference between judgment and 
“proposition in itself”; but just as the proposition must be separated from the judgment, so 
also must it be separated from the state of affairs. A proposition is true when the state of 
affairs which is correlated with it obtains. And two contradictory propositions cannot both 
                                                 
9 The contemporary philosopher Reinach most resembles in this respect may be R. Chisholm, who defined 
propositions as states of affairs “such that the laws of propositional logic may be interpreted as being applicable 
to them” (Chisholm, 1970, p. 19). 
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be true because two contradictory states of affairs cannot both subsist. Thus here too the 
propositional law is reducible to a law which relates to states of affairs. At the same time 
this provides an example which may indicate the sense of our claim above, that the major 
part of traditional logic will prove to have its foundations in a general theory of states of 
affairs (daß große Teile der traditionellen Logik sich ihrem Fundamente nach als 
allgemeine Sachverhaltslehre herausstellen werden). (TnU, p. 138/376, transl. by Smith, 
slightly modified.) 
 
To some extent, these views still converge with the Logical Investigations. According to the 
first and fourth Investigations (LU1, § 29; LU4, § 14), certain logical laws can be formulated 
in an equivalent way as ontological laws. The logical principle of non-contradiction may thus 
be translated into an formal-ontological law stating that two contradictory states of affairs 
cannot both obtain. The difference between both authors is about what this equivalence 
relation really means and implies. In fact, Reinach did much more than call attention on this 
equivalence as Husserl had done before him (Seron, 2011). He claimed that the laws of 
proposition “are reducible to (zurückführen auf) laws which relate to states of affairs,” and that 
“the major part of traditional logic will therefore prove to have its foundations in a general theory of 
states of affairs.” 
One should be careful not to overestimate the extent of this claim. Reinach’s ambition was 
certainly not to boil down all logical into ontological distinctions between states of affairs. On 
the contrary, it is consistant with the view that logical categories are, to some extent, 
autonomous vis-a-vis ontological categories. 
Reinach’s argument is that one can make positive judgments about negative states of affairs (I 
assert that the flower is not red) and negative judgments about positive states of affairs (I deny 
that the flower is red). This shows, he claims, that the logical difference between positive and 
negative judgments cannot be merely reduced to the ontological difference between positive 
and negative states of affairs. In this sense, logical classifications lie in part beyond the sphere 
of states of affairs: “A logic which systematically carried through the distinction between 
judgment and judged state of affairs could scarcely decline to classify judgments according to 
the characteristics of their correlated states of affairs.” (TnU, p. 122/351.) Hence we may 
suppose that actually Reinach’s logic is not confined to states of affairs and applies to 
propositions and judgments as well (DuBois, 1995, p. 117-118; cf. B. Smith, 1987b, p. 192). 
This approach is clearly illustrated in an obituary of William James published in 1910 (WJ, p. 
50). In this text, Reinach starts by rejecting the pragmatist view of truth in the name of 
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correspondentism. Then, in (more unexpected) terms which recall neo-Kantianism, he 
attributes to James the merit of having refuted the copy theory of truth. Now, his line of 
argument against the Abbildtheorie fits well with the idea that logical structures do not merely 
reflect ontological structures. Most interestingly, the conception of truth Reinach adopts is 
certainly correspondentist, but not explicitly maximalist. “A judgment is true, he argues, if the 
state of affairs it refers to obtains.”10 The relation between truth and the state of affairs’ 
obtaining is conceived here as a relation of mere implication, not of equivalence. Herein lies 
an important difference between Reinach and Wittgenstein’s Tractatus, which defends 
maximalism about elementary propositions.11 The former does not rule out the possibility that 
a true proposition refers to a non-obtaining state of affairs.12 
It thus seems that Reinach’s aim is not merely to reduce propositional logic to an ontology of 
states of affairs. Nevertheless, it remains true that, in another sense, Reinach’s logic is no 
more than a theory of states of affairs. But other explanations are required in order to 
understand this idea. 
The Introduction to Philosophy provides a precise definition of what logic is: 
 
Logic is (1) a general theory of science, as far as it provides the laws of foundation 
(Begründungsgesetze) in general and thus gives the form for the relations of foundation that 
apply to all science; (2) a special theory of science, as far as it refers to the laws of 
foundation relevant for special sciences, and to types of special science. (EiP, p. 453.) 
 
                                                 
10 WJ, p. 49: “Ein Urteil ist wahr, wenn der Sachverhalt, auf den es sich bezieht, besteht.” Cf. TnU, p. 138/376: 
“Ein Urteil ist richtig, wenn der zugehörige Sachverhalt besteht.” 
11 Wittgenstein (1963), 4.25: “Ist der Elementarsatz wahr, so besteht der Sachverhalt; ist der Elementarsatz 
falsch, so besteht der Sachverhalt nicht.” 
12 The question of whether all true proposition corresponds to an (obtaining) state of affairs should not be 
confused with the question of whether all (true or false) proposition corresponds to an (obtaining or non-
obtaining) state of affairs. While Reinach’s answer to the first question is clearly yes, his answer to the second 
one is far from clear. 
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In short: logic deals with relations of inference. It is a theory which supplies rules for 
grounding a judgment in another judgment, hence a theory whose objects are relations of 
antecedent and consequent. 
Now, as we have seen, Reinach takes such relations to hold between states of affairs rather 
than between propositions or judgments. The powerful originality of his philosophy of logic 
lies in the fact that he undertook to ontologize the relations of implication and inference.13 
Since these originally lie in the states of affairs, it is only in a derivative sense that implication 
is a relation between propositions or judgments. As a consequence, it is also in a derivative 
sense that logical principles, as rules of inference, apply to propositions or judgments. The 
principle of non-contradiction originally means that two contradictory states of affairs cannot 
both obtain; the principle of the excluded middle means that “there is no third between the 
obtaining and the non-obtaining of a state of affairs” (EiP, p. 477); etc. 
Reinach clearly equates implication with inference, even going so far as to talk of “axiomatic” 
(axiomatische) and “theorematic” (gefolgerte) states of affairs (EiP, p. 404). But such an 
approach is fraught with difficulties. It may seem not too difficult to locate implication 
relations in the “things themselves,” at least in the sense that true conditional propositions 
must correspond to obtaining states of affairs. But the same hardly applies to inference. For 
inferences, unlike conditionals, are not true or false, but valid or not valid (cf. Gochet & 
Gribomont, 1990, p. 35-37). 
4. Reinach’s realism and its difficulties 
Of course, the fact that Reinach replaces talk of propositions by talk of states of affairs is not a 
detail. It is at least plausible to believe that the two approaches will have different ontological 
implications. 
Consider, for example, an incorrect judgment that S is P. The judgment is incorrect because 
the corresponding state of affairs, S’s being P, does not obtain. From Husserl’s point of view, 
the judgment has sense, that is, has a false proposition as its content, even though there is no 
corresponding state of affairs. In a sense, this makes it possible to achieve a notable 
ontological economy. For propositions, in the Logical Investigations, are defined to be 
                                                 
13 Cf. EiP, p. 453: “It is not contingent that certain types of foundation relations are connected with certain 
objective assumptions. The sphere of logic is obviously larger than the sphere of the foundation relations.” 
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“species of judgment,” that is, intentional contents which the psychologist considers as 
“intentional matters” and the logician as meanings “in specie.”14 Certainly, the logician, for 
Husserl, considers propositions independently of their realization in mental acts. But this is 
just one face of the coin. The other is that the psychologist or phenomenologist reveals to the 
logician that her propositions really are abstract parts of mental acts. The “phenomenological 
foundation of logic” precisely means that the logician achieves her “ideations” on the basis of 
empirical materials which are, so to speak, provided by the psychologist. The general thought 
seems to be that, absolutely speaking, propositions ontologically commit us to the existence of 
no objects except the mental acts that instantiate them.15 Hence, as Barry Smith has rightly 
suggested, Husserl’s semantic objectivism in the Investigations is better seen as an 
Aristotelism of intentional contents than as a Fregean-style Platonism of meanings (B. Smith, 
1989b; Seron, 2012; Seron, forthcoming). 
How are incorrect positive judgments to be described within the frame of Reinach’s logic of 
states of affairs? First, Reinach assumes that non-obtaining states of affairs cannot be 
“known.” Yet, it remains that “we speak of states of affairs like the being golden of mountains 
or the being round of squares” (TnU, p. 117/340-341). In other words, non-obtaining states of 
affairs can be “meant” (gemeint). States of affairs — as opposed to objects, which are 
presented (vorgestellt) — are “meant” or “in view” (abzielen auf). What best characterizes the 
“meaning” of a state of affairs is that it always has a linguistic dimension (TnU, p. 102/323) 
and is independent of any intuitive givenness. Intuition — that is, “knowledge” or “evidence” 
— is not necessary for the state of affairs to be meant or thought. Intuition is to be seen as an 
“accompanying” (begleitend) content, which is not immanent in the state of affairs or its 
meaning (TnU, p. 106-108/328-330). Briefly: there still are states of affairs to be thought even 
where there are no states of affairs to be known, as it may be the case with incorrect positive 
judgment. 
These views have difficulties. Suppose that an incorrect positive judgment “means” a non-
obtaining state of affairs. This may suggest that non-obtaining states of affairs have some kind 
                                                 
14 The interpretation here outlined — which is much indebted to Kusch (1995) — is developed in more detail in 
Seron (2012) and Seron (forthcoming). 
15 Cf. LU5, A322/79: “As with all ideal unities, there are real possibilities, and perhaps actualities, which 
correspond to meanings: to meanings in specie correspond acts of meaning, the former being nothing but ideally 
apprehended act characters of the latter (jene sind nichts anderes als die ideal gefaßten Aktcharaktere dieser).” 
B343: “… als ideal gefaßte Momente aus diesen.” I generally cite the first edition (A). 
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of objectivity. But obvious difficulties arise at this point: What would this objectivity consist 
in, if it must be distinct from the state of affair’s obtaining? Where are non-obtaining states of 
affairs to be found, if they cannot reside in the mental act?16 
It may be noted in passing that it is not always clear that non-obtaining states of affairs, for 
Reinach, must be “meant” rather than “known.” In the essay on negative judgment, Reinach 
thus considers the case of a negative conviction in a positive state of affairs (TnU, p. 123-
124/352-353). For example, I refuse to believe that this flower is yellow. The conviction, 
Reinach observes, rests on some positive evidence: I resist the belief that the flower is yellow 
because I see that it is red. But on the other hand, he also claims that the state of affairs /the 
flower is yellow/ provides some special form of evidence or knowledge, which he calls 
“negative evidence.” This seems to imply that non-obtaining states of affairs, too, are subject 
to evidence. 
Barry Smith has clearly pointed out the problem in the introduction to his translation of the 
essay on negative judgment (B. Smith, 1982, p. 294-295). He first attributed to Bolzano, 
Frege, Meinong, and Chisholm a radical view according to which every correct or incorrect 
judgment requires a “statal entity.” Next, he argued that “a view of this kind is defensible only 
where it relates to entities belonging to the sphere of meaning (to Frege’s ‘realm of sense’) or, 
as in Meinong’s case, to some hybrid sphere of quasi-meanings.” To put it another way: for 
such a view to be tenable, the statal entities must be logical objects, namely Fregean-style 
propositions or (to some extent) Meinongian “objectives.” 
The opposite view, Smith continues, is to conceive the states of affairs incorrect positive 
judgments refer to merely as “object-entities,” hence as truth-makers rather than as truth-
bearers. But this view involves a very counterintuitive version of Platonism: “What  mind-
independent external referent, what constituent part or contour of the world, could correspond, 
for example, to a false sentence, to a counterfactual conditional, or to a judgment concerning 
the indefinite future?” Now, there are two options to escape the difficulty. The first one — 
which is the option chosen by Russell, for example — is to deny that incorrect positive 
                                                 
16 Benoist (2005), p. 27, rightly argues that these difficulties are caused by a confusion of intentionality with 
presentation — a confusion which Reinach precisely avoids by his notion of “meaning.” Unlike presented 
objects, states of affairs do not need to exist or be present. Cf. EiP, p. 419: “Ein gemeinter Gegenstand braucht 
nicht zu existieren”; WSU, p. 339: “Das Denken ist ein Abzielen auf Nichtgegenwärtiges, das Vorstellen ist das 
Vorsichhaben eines Gegenwärtigen.” However, this does not release us from the need to identify the ontological 
status of states of affairs and to explicate why they cannot be replaced with propositions. 
 15
judgments have statal correlates. The second option is the one favored by Reinach. It consists 
in “distinguishing amongst the totality of autonomously existing states of affairs, subsistent 
states of affairs corresponding to true judgments, and non-subsistent states of affairs 
corresponding to those that are false.” Smith attributes this position to Reinach, Meinong, and 
the Tractarian Wittgenstein. 
From this perspective, Husserl’s approach may seem more economical. Barry Smith thus 
defended the view that Husserl’s theory of states of affairs is naturalist rather than Platonist 
(B. Smith, 1989, p. 63). Husserl’s version of Platonism, if there is any, is about propositions, 
not states of affairs — which he considers to be mere truth-making components of the real 
world. Reinach, by contrast, is a Platonist about states of affairs, in that for him the 
timelessness of truth must be accounted for by appealing to a timeless sphere of (obtaining or 
non-obtaining) states of affairs. 
I have suggested that the key claim of Husserl’s attempt at a “phenomenological foundation 
of logic” is that propositions are “species of judgment,” and hence abstract parts of mental 
acts. This means that, although they can be studied “in themselves,” propositions, in last 
resort, exist only “in” the mental acts that instantiate them. As Husserl argues in the first 
Investigation and in his review of Palágyi, the case of propositions is analogous to that of 
colors (Hua 22, p. 157; LU1, A100-101/230). It is no doubt possible to study colors in specie, 
with no concern whatever for colored things, so as to state a priori laws such as “the additive 
synthesis of green and red is yellow.” Yet, it remains that colors, absolutely speaking, exist 
only in spatially extended things. Likewise, Husserl considers the existence of “ideal” logical 
laws consistent with the fact that propositions are abstracta which exist only in mental 
particulars. Grounding logic, in his view, means revealing or “clarifying” the intuitive basis of 
logic, that is, descriptive materials for the logician’s ideations. But since logical objects are 
abstracta which exist only in mental acts, this intuitive basis must be psychological or 
phenomenological. To put it otherwise: the logician’s ideation is, as Husserl says in the sixth 
Logical Investigation, a “founded act,” namely an act which is based upon internal perception 
— this being, in the first edition of the Investigations just as for Brentano, the very experience 
that constitutes psychology as an empirical science. Accordingly, the foundation of logic 
requires one to assume no more than the existence of mental acts. This foundation is 
“metaphysically neutral” as to the objective world, for the simple reason that, in Brentano’s 
view, mental phenomena are the only things the descriptive psychologist needs to posit as 
really existent. 
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Now, what happens if we accept Reinach’s claim that logical laws are not about propositions, 
but about states of affairs? The divergence lies in the fact that for Reinach, as he repeatedly 
insists, the state of affairs’s obtaining or non-obtaining is independent of the subject. A 
proposition is true in itself, independently of the subject, because the corresponding state of 
affairs obtains in itself, independently of the subject (TnU, p. 137/369-370; ÜPh, p. 544-545). 
In other words: the foundation of logic must be realist rather than psychological or 
phenomenological (in the Husserlian sense). Certainly, the task still consists, as in the 
Investigations, in clarifying the intuitive sources of logical laws. But the intuition concerned 
cannot be the psychologist’s experience. Rather, this intuition must be the “knowledge” of 
states of affairs which obtain mind-independently in the objective world. 
Obviously, such a foundation, if it is to be called “phenomenological,” can be called so only 
in a very different sense than in the Logical Investigations. Reinach’s phenomenology is not 
identical with descriptive psychology as in the first edition of the Investigations; nor has it 
anything to do with the later transcendental phenomenology. Nevertheless, the comparison 
with the Investigations helps to clarify exactly what a “realist phenomenology” is supposed to 
be. One of the key ideas in On Phenomenology is that phenomenology does not distinguish 
itself by its domain of objects. Phenomenology is not, say, that science which concerns itself 
with purely immanent objects — with objects which should be marked off from the 
transcendent objects through phenomenological reduction. As James DuBois (1995, p. 148) 
has pointed out, the word “epoché” does not occur even once in Reinach’s published writings. 
Rather, Reinach’s phenomenology is a matter of “attitude.” It involves some new perspective 
on the same real world we deal with in our everyday life, namely a perspective grounded in 
the “intuition of essences.”17 The theory of states of affairs has to play a central role in this 
respect. For intuiting essences, for Reinach, always means intuiting a priori states of affairs, 
namely essential connections in things. As Reinach puts in the Introduction to Philosophy of 
1913, phenomenological analysis is intended to give us access to the “things themselves” by 
“disclosing objectities (...) in such a way that one can intuit (erschauen) their essences.”18 In 
                                                 
17 In this sense, the eidetic dimension aside, Reinach’s conception of phenomenology displays striking 
similarities with Drummond’s and Sokolowski’s externalist readings of Husserl. 
18 “Much work and effort is needed for one to know the essential connections and to get to the things themselves 
(an die Sachen zu gelangen). (...) It has been said that phenomenology starts with the  ‘intuition of essences’ 
(Wesenserschauung). This sounds mystical, but is clear. Analysis supersedes simple vision (tritt nämlich an die 
Stelle des blossen Dahinsehens) so as to disclose objectities (...) in such a way that one can intuit (erschauen) 
their essences.” (EiP, p.  448.) 
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Reinach’s terminology, erschauen means intuiting a state of affairs, as opposed to schauen 
which means intuiting an object (see above). This approach is original when compared to the 
views of other realist phenomenologists, like Johannes Daubert and Jean Hering. These two 
philosophers, too, consider essence laws to be about foundation relations among essences.19 
But Daubert does not mention states of affairs in this connection, and Hering explicitly rejects 
the view that these relations could be states of affairs (Hering, 1921, p. 524; cf. p. 496-497). 
These last remarks bring us into the heart of Reinach’s realism. We might venture to say that 
the difference between his philosophy of logic and that of Husserl in the Prolegomena 
somehow coincides with the difference between the logical objectivity of truth and the 
metaphysical objectivity of states of affairs. This brings us back to Barry Smith’s discussion 
of Reinach’s Platonism. In the Investigations, Husserl certainly considers a proposition’s 
being true as trivially synonymous with its being true in itself. But on the other hand, he also 
conceives of logic as a reflective science (cf. LU1, § 34), in the sense that its “foundation” 
necessitates psychological or phenomenological description of the corresponding mental 
acts.20 In Reinach’s view, by contrast, the foundation of logic requires us to turn to the extra-
mental world. Logical properties, relations, truths in general primarily lie in the states of 
affairs, which exist in themselves, independently of any mental acts. 
For this reason, the central idea of Reinach’s realism is not merely that the obtaining of states 
of affairs is logically prior to the truth of propositions and the correctness of judgments. 
Reinach also needs the further premise that there are mind-independent states of affairs — a 
premise which Reinach (controversially) views as alien to Husserl’s transcendental 
phenomenology.21 
The results of our discussions can be recapitulated as follows: First, Reinach’s aim is to 
replace Husserl’s idea of grounding propositional logic on psychological description by the 
                                                 
19 On Daubert, see Fréchette (2001), p. 312 ff. 
20 Matters are somewhat more complicated, however, since Husserl also holds in the Investigations that a 
proposition’s being true in itself implies a state of affairs’ obtaining in itself as its “necessary correlate” (LU, 
Proleg., § 62). But what is important here is that the objectivity of states of affairs is the business of the logician 
(or the “formal-ontologist”), not of the phenomenologist. 
21 Cf. EiP, p. 484: “The essential (wesensgeseztliche) possibility of independent existence is here admitted, in 
fact assumed.” Cf. Sämtliche Werke, p. 737, about Husserl: “streiche ich das Bewußtsein, so streiche ich die 
Welt.” 
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idea of grounding a statal logic on the “knowledge” of a priori states of affairs. So, such a 
foundation can be called “phenomenological” only in quite a different sense. It is no longer 
the descriptive psychologist’s internal experience that defines the phenomenological attitude, 
but the intuition of states of affairs of a certain type. Now, Reinach’s characterization of states 
of affairs as essentially mind-independent involves a realist line of thought which surely 
represents a move away from the metaphysical neutrality of phenomenology in the Logical 
Investigations. This clearly shows the strategic role of the theory of states of affairs in 
Reinach’s philosophical project. For it is precisely the theory of states of affairs that makes 
phenomenology compatible with realism. If the intuition of a priori states of affairs is to 
define phenomenology, then the essential mind-independence of states of affairs entails that 
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